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Abstract—Energy harvesting is a promising solution to power
Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Due to the intermittent nature of
these energy sources, one cannot guarantee forward progress of
program execution. Prior work has advocated for checkpointing
the intermediate state to off-chip non-volatile memory (NVM).
Encrypting checkpoints addresses the security concern, but
significantly increases the checkpointing overheads. In this paper,
we propose a new online checkpointing policy that judiciously
determines when to checkpoint so as to minimize application
time to completion while guaranteeing security. Compared to
state-of-the-art checkpointing schemes that do not account for
the overheads of encrypted checkpoints we improve execution
time up to 1.4×.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is envisioned as a network of
devices that operate anytime from anywhere. IoT devices are
expected to be small and guarantee perpetual and autonomous
operation even in hard to reach places. Energy harvesting
has been proposed as the source of energy for such IoT
devices [1], [2]. Ambient energy can be harvested from
many sources, including solar, wind, thermal, WiFi, radio
frequency, biological and chemical [3]–[5]. The amount of
energy harvested is highly time varying and the energy supply
is intermittent. For this reason, processors with off-chip non-
volatile main memory (and potentially even on-chip caches
and register files) have been proposed [1], [6] to guarantee
forward progress of program execution. In these approaches,
the processor saves its intermediate results in non-volatile
memory when the energy supply is too low for the processor
to operate.
Security is another critical concern with IoT devices. An
attacker with physical access to an IoT device might be able
to read out potentially sensitive data from the non-volatile
memory [7]. Prior work secures data in IoT devices using
non-volatile main memory, i.e. by encrypting and decrypting
every write to and read from the non-volatile memory [8], [9].
However, simply encrypting main memory is not sufficient. An
attacker might capture an IoT device in the middle of program
execution and recover a checkpoint of architectural state. In
fact, prior work has shown that unencrypted intermediate
program state is an even greater security threat [10]. Thus, we
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Fig. 1: Runtime execution progress of the FFT program
running on harvested energy with (a) no encryption and (b)
PRINCE [11] as the block cipher. Vertical lines represent
checkpoints and arrows show roll-backs due to energy failure.
Encryption increases the average energy and latency of each
checkpoint. Due to this overhead, the total number of roll-
backs, time spent for each checkpoint and therefore the
program execution time increases.
propose to encrypt the intermediate checkpoints of program
state to guarantee confidentiality at all times during program
execution.
Encryption increases the energy and latency overhead
of checkpoints, by 11.6% and 200% respectively for
PRINCE [11] block cipher. Finding the optimum checkpoint
placement policy when the energy source is intermittent is
crucial, and becomes even more significant when checkpoints
have to be encrypted for security. Naively replacing un-
encrypted checkpoints (Fig 1a) with encrypted checkpoints
(Fig 1b) can significantly increase the number of roll-backs
and total program execution time. This motivates the need
for a smart checkpointing policy that places checkpoints
judiciously. The checkpointing policy must account for mul-
tiple factors including the energy level of the battery, the
stochastic behaviour of the harvested energy (which differ
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Fig. 2: Optimal checkpointing of secure IoT processors: System model with a finite-sized battery with capacity Bmax and
random energy arrivals. At a checkpoint, the volatile IoT system state (Program Counter (PC), Register File (RF) and dirty
cache lines) is encrypted and saved into NVM.
from one source to another), when the previous checkpoint
was taken, and the expected time to program completion. Prior
checkpointing policies account for some of these effects, for
instance, periodic checkpointing [12] or checkpointing when
the available energy in the battery falls below a threshold [13],
[14].
We formalize the online checkpointing problem as a Markov
decision process, and compute the optimal checkpointing
policy offline using Q-learning [15]. Online decisions are made
using a table including the optimum action which is obtained
from the Q-table (stored in memory). Our solution: (i) is the
first approach that simultaneously (and explicitly) accounts
for: the current battery level, previous time a checkpoint
was taken, and the program’s forward progress in informing
checkpointing decisions; (ii) accounts for the stochastic nature
of the energy source, checkpointing overheads, and proces-
sor energy consumption; (iii) uses a model-free approach
to solving the Markov decision process that can be trained
using empirically obtained and synthetically generated traces
of harvested energy; and (iv) offers computational and energy
efficient hardware solutions to make online decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I-A
reviews the recent work in this area, while Section II explains
system model and the proposed Q-learning based online
checkpointing policy. Section III describes our experimental
setup, results and compares the proposed approach to prior
art. We conclude in Section IV to future work.
A. Related Work
Checkpointing has been used for fault tolerance in com-
puting systems [16], [17], allowing the processor to roll back
to the last valid checkpoint and recover the processor state
in case of failure. Okamura et al. [18] propose a dynamic
checkpointing scheme based on Q-learning for fault-tolerance,
but assume random failures unrelated to energy harvesting or
power failures.
Checkpointing has also been used to guarantee forward
progress in intermittently powered devices [6], [12]–[14], [19],
[20]. Mementos [20] inserts trigger points in the software
at compile time and, at run time, checkpoints when the
stored energy level falls below a threshold at a trigger point.
QuickRecall [14] and Hibernus [13] propose a policy based on
two thresholds, one that triggers checkpoints (when the energy
level falls below a low threshold) and one that determines
when to start re-execution (when the energy level rises above
a high threshold). A similar approach is used in [6], except
that they assume access to a processor with on-chip non-
volatile state. Hardware support for checkpointing that uses
two counters for number of instructions and number of stores
is proposed in [12]. A checkpoint is performed if either of the
two counters exceeds its threshold.
From a security stand-point, several proposals exist on main
memory encryption for security, [8], [9] but they do not
consider battery-operated intermittently powered processors.
Finally, Q-learning has been used in other online decision mak-
ing contexts such as communications and power management
[21]–[23].
II. ONLINE CHECKPOINTING
We describe an online checkpointing framework for secure
IoT processors starting with the system model, a mathematical
formulation of the optimal checkpointing problem, and a
learning based solution.
A. System Model
Our target IoT system shown in Fig 2, includes an in-
order processor with conventional volatile caches and registers
running on harvested energy and an off-chip non-volatile main
memory. Although the proposed techniques are agnostic to the
NVM technology, in Section III we empirically evaluate an
RRAM-based NVM. For securing the checkpoints, our system
encrypts main memory similar to prior work [8], [9]. Data
blocks written to and read from main memory are encrypted
and decrypted, respectively, using a light-weight block cipher
PRINCE [11].
The system is powered by harvested energy which is highly
intermittent. To smooth out large temporal variations in har-
vested energy, the IoT device has on-board energy storage1.
1On-board energy storage can range from a simple super-capacitor to a
battery management IC with an in-built battery tailored for ultra-low power
energy harvesting devices such as the TI BQ25504 [24].
To guarantee forward progress of program execution, the
processor state is checkpointed in NVM, and to guarantee
security, all checkpoints are encrypted before being written
to the NVM. Shown as shaded in Fig 2, a checkpointed IoT
system state consists of: (i) the program counter (PC), (ii) the
contents of the register file (RF); and (iii) all dirty cache lines
in the L1 data cache2. The NVM has a shadow memory to
store a checkpoint.
When rolling back to the last checkpoint, the state of the
system consisting of volatile and non-volatile states should
be maintained consistently. The volatile states are stored and
recovered from the shadow memory, therefore they remain
consistent. Ransford et. al. [25] showed that checkpointing
and recovering the program state can lead to inconsistency in
the NVM. All writes to NVM that happen after a checkpoint
change the non-volatile state of the program. In case of an
energy failure, the processor rolls back to the checkpointed
state and the volatile states are recovered correctly, however,
the non-volatile state has changed since the checkpoint and
the NVM will be inconsistent.
To address this issue, previous work has proposed enforcing
a checkpoint between every non-idempotent memory access
pairs [26], or versioning the inconsistent data [27] so that
every non-idempotent memory access pair is eliminated. Liu
et. al. [12] propose a hardware solution in which all stores
are regarded as speculative and are delayed. These stores
are written back to non-volatile memory only when the
program reaches the next checkpoint. To keep the overhead
of processing low and avoid placing an excessive number of
checkpoints, we simply expand the shadow memory to keep
track of the memory locations which are written to between
two checkpoints. For each write to the non-volatile memory,
the previous value in the memory is copied to the shadow
memory. If the next checkpoint is performed successfully,
these values are discarded and otherwise they are restored
along with the saved volatile state.
Finally, the IoT processor is provisioned with the sched-
uler module (Fig 2), that determines when checkpoints are
performed. The design and evaluation of a security-aware
checkpoint scheduler is the primary contribution of this work.
B. Problem Formulation
The checkpoint scheduler decides whether to checkpoint
or not every N instructions. Every block of N executed
instructions is referred to as an interval. To track forward
progress, the scheduler maintains two run-time counters: (i) a
Progress Counter (PrC) which counts the number of intervals
of actual forward progress that the program has made; and
(ii) a Checkpoint Counter (CC) which records when the last
checkpoint was taken. Both counters are initialized to zero
when the program begins. PrC is incremented every time N
instructions execute successfully. If a checkpoint is made, CC
is updated to the current PrC. Finally, on energy failure, the
2We assume a single-level cache hierarchy.
Fig. 3: State transition diagram for actions achpt (checkpoint)
and aproc (no checkpoint) with and without an energy failure
event. Each state is defined as si = (pi, ci, bi) where pi
represents the progress made so far, ci is where the last
checkpoint was performed and bi is the current battery level.
For each action, C indicates the immediate cost incurred from
that action.
processor rolls back to the last checkpointed state and this
resets PrC to the current value of CC.
We formulate the execution of a program with online check-
pointing as an instance of a Markov decision process (MDP)
consisting of a set of states S, a set of actions A, a stochastic
transition function T : S × A × S → [0, 1] which gives
the probability of moving from one state to another for each
action, and an immediate cost function C : S ×A× S → R.
In our formulation, the state of the Markov decision process
is given by the current values of the progress counter (PrC),
the checkpoint counter (CC) and the battery level. Specifically,
the state at the end of each control interval i is given by
si = (pi, ci, bi) where pi is the PrC value (representing the
progress made so far), ci is CC (when the last checkpoint
was performed) and bi is the current battery level. The set
of actions is A ∈ {achpt, aproc}, where the action achpt rep-
resents taking a checkpoint while the action aproc represents
proceeding without a checkpoint.
If the scheduler decides to checkpoint, a cost tcp corre-
sponding to the latency of checkpointing is incurred. Assuming
no energy failure during the next interval, the next state
is si+1 = {pi + 1, pi, bi+1}. On the other hand, if there
is an energy failure in the next interval, the next state is
si+1 = {pi, pi, b′i+1}. In both cases, bi+1 and b′i+1 are the new
battery levels accounting for the energy cost of checkpointing,
the net energy received/consumed in interval i+ 1.
On the other hand, if the scheduler decides not to check-
point, there is no immediate cost. Assuming no energy failure
during the next interval, the next state is si+1 = {pi +
1, ci, bi+1}. However, if there is an energy failure in the next
interval, the next state is si+1 = {ci, ci, b′i+1}, incurring a
cost of (pi− ci)×N representing the lost progress. The state
transition diagram is shown in Fig 3.
The optimal policy balances the cost of checkpointing with
the cost of recovering from an energy failure by rolling back
to the last checkpoint. The total cost can be defined as the time
overhead of checkpointing plus the re-execution time due to
roll-backs. Given the Markov decision process specification,
our goal is to find an optimal policy pi∗ : S → A which
minimizes the total expected cost as defined above, i.e., the
expected overhead of the checkpointing policy relative to the
baseline uninterrupted execution time. The optimal policy can
be obtained by solving for a fixed-point of the Markov decision
process given the stochastic model for the harvested energy
and system statistics i.e., the probability of energy failure
in future control intervals and a distribution of next state
battery levels. However, this model would be hard to obtain
and can be highly inaccurate. Hence, the proposed system
learns an optimal policy using experimentally obtained traces
of harvested energy and system statistics.
C. Offline Learning of Checkpointing Policy
The system uses the Q-learning algorithm to find the optimal
policy. This algorithm assigns a Q-value to each state-action
pair Q : S × A → R that, once the algorithm converges,
represents the expected total cost of executing action a in state
s and choosing greedy actions afterwards. The algorithm starts
by initializing all Q-values arbitrarily, and iteratively updates
by simulating the system. In iteration i, the algorithm chooses
the action a that results in the smallest Q-value for the current
state, simulates the system, and observes the next state and
corresponding cost. It then updates the Q-values as follows:
Q(si, a)← Qi(si, a)+
α(C(si, a) + γ min
a′∈A
Qi(si+1, a
′)−Qi(si, a)). (1)
Here, C(s, a) is the checkpointing cost tcp for checkpointing
and roll-back cost (pi−ci)×N in the event of an energy failure
for no checkpointing. The parameter γ discounts future costs,
and α determines the learning rate, i.e., how strongly the Q-
values are overwritten by new ones after each iteration. With
certain constraints on the learning rate [28], the Q-values have
been proven to converge to those corresponding to the optimal
policy pi∗. Empirically, we found that using a variable learning
rate worked best in practice.
α(s,a) =
1
n(s, a)
(2)
where n(s, a) is the number of times a state-action pair (s, a)
is visited. Further, we use the  − greedy algorithm which
chooses an action at random with probability  and follows
the greedy strategy with probability 1−  where 0 <  < 1.
D. Online Decision Making
After the Q table is learned, it is used online to derive the
optimal policy for any state by picking the action with smallest
Q-value. Therefore, it is sufficient to store one action bit
corresponding to the optimum action for each state. For a small
state-space, this approach entails small memory overhead and
Fig. 4: Illustration of the checkpointing policy. A mandatory
checkpoint is taken after every super interval (S intervals).
Within an interval, the checkpointing decisions are made based
on the learned Q-table.
has the benefit of low energy consumption since it only
requires one read from memory at the end of each interval.
The state-space of the Markov decision process grows
quadratically with the number of intervals and hence with the
dynamic execution length of the program. This can result in
large offline training times for the Q-learning to converge, as
well as large storage requirements for action bit values. We
use a hybrid policy as shown in Fig 4 that checkpoints every
S intervals (the super-interval). The optimal checkpointing lo-
cations within a super-interval are determined by the proposed
Q-learning approach. The hybrid approach limits the size of
the Markov decision process state-space to S2B states, where
B is the number of possible battery levels. As a result, we
are able to limit not only the training time, but the maximum
amount of space required to store the Q-table in non-volatile
main memory.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. System Setup
For experimental evaluation, we used the TigerMIPS pro-
cessor, a 32-bit 5-stage implementation of the MIPS ISA
which includes 8KB L1 instruction and data caches [29].
The light-weight PRINCE block cipher is used to encrypt
and decrypt data written to and read from the non-volatile
main memory. In order to reduce the overhead of memory
writes, a TigerMIPS’ write-through cache is replaced with a
write-back cache. An RRAM based non-volatile main memory
is assumed, and NVSim [30] is used to derive power and
performance parameters for an 8 MB non-volatile memory.
The TigerMIPS RTL was modified to incorporate check-
pointing and roll-back operations. On a checkpoint, the fetch
stage is stalled until all instructions in the pipeline retire. The
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 5: Generating synthetic power traces based on measured
harvested power from radio frequency. (a) measured radio
frequency power trace from [6], (b) quantized measured power
to six power levels, and (c) the synthetic power trace with
transition probabilities extracted from the quantized measured
trace.
contents of PC, RF and dirty cache lines are encrypted and
written back to main memory. The effect of energy failure is
simulated by flushing the processor’s pipeline, discarding the
data in the instruction and data caches, and resetting the RF
and PC. When energy is restored, the checkpointed state is
read from main memory, decrypted and restored in the pro-
cessor. The modified TigerMIPS processor and PRINCE block
cipher are synthesized using Cadence RTL Compiler [31] with
a 45 nm technology library and a target 100 KHz clock. The
Vdd was set at 1.1V .
For Q-learning we set the discount factor γ = 1, and  (i.e.,
the rate at which random actions are picked instead of greedy
ones) was reduced from 0.9 to 0.1 so as to perform more action
exploration at the beginning. The size of an interval N is set to
500 instructions, and a super-interval S contains 100 intervals
(i.e., a super-interval has 50K instructions). Thus, the Progress
Counter and Checkpoint Counter are small (9 bits each).
For a super interval containing 100 intervals and 20 battery
levels, the state-space has 100 × 100 × 20 = 200K states.
For each state, one action bit needs to be stored in memory,
indicating whether a checkpoint has to be placed or not.
Therefore, a memory size of 25KB would be sufficient to
store the Q-table information. At run time, the action bit
corresponding to the current state is read and the appropriate
action is performed by the scheduler.
Energy Penalty Analysis: The energy penalty of storing
Fig. 6: In-house toolflow developed for experimental validation
of the proposed approach.
the action bits in NVM and reading is one read from the non-
volatile memory every interval which adds up to 65.16pJ ×
100 = 6.5nJ per super-interval. This is only 0.002% of the
energy consumed by the processor in a super-interval.
We model a radio frequency based energy harvesting source
as described by [6]. Unfortunately, the sample power traces
provided are small, while we need large traces both for training
and validation. Modeling the harvested power as a Markov
chain is common in literature [32]. Thus, we developed a
first-order Markov chain based model for the harvested power
that transitions between six discrete power levels. To obtain
the transition probabilities, we quantized the measured trace
to six power levels, L = {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25} (power levels
in mW ). We construct a transition matrix T , where T (i, j)
indicates the number of power level transitions from pi to
pj within the trace, where pi, pj ∈ L. Each row i of the
transition matrix keeps track of the number of transitions from
power level pi to all other power levels. Therefore, we can
estimate the transition probabilities between power levels from
the transition matrix. Fig 5a shows the measured power from
a radio frequency source. The quantized power over the six
levels is shown in Fig 5b. Once the transition matrix and
the transition probability matrix is obtained, we can use the
Markov chain model to obtain new synthetic power traces. An
example of a synthetic power trace generated using this model
is shown in Fig 5c.
We assume a battery with a 2 µJ capacity which is smaller
than the ≈ 20µJ battery assumed in QuickRecall [14] but
larger than the ≈ 0.5µJ capacity in [6].
Table I shows the estimated energy consumption for differ-
ent components of our system, the average incoming energy,
and battery parameters.
B. Tool Flow
Our validation tool flow is shown in Fig 6 and is based on
two components: an offline component that learns the optimal
policy and obtains the action bit table based on the learned Q-
table in MATLAB, and an on-line component that uses detailed
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Processor 6.3 nJ/inst Action Bit Memory 25KB
PRINCE 1.6 nJ/8B block Harvested (Avg) 6 nJ/clock
NV Read 65.16 pJ/4B line Battery Capacity 2 µJ
NV Write 71.78 pJ/4B line Battery Levels 20
TABLE I: Experimental parameters. The processor and
PRINCE cipher energy consumptions are obtained from
RTL synthesis. The data for non-volatile memory is from
NVSim [30].
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Converged Q-values for achpt and aproc as a function of
battery level for (a) PrC = 10 and CC = 9, i.e., at the 10th
interval with the most recent checkpoint at the 9th interval,
and (b) PrC = 10 and CC = 4.
RTL simulations to measure execution time using our proposed
and other state-of-the-art checkpointing policies.
The offline Q-learning phase takes as input the energy
harvesting traces and average of processor power consumption
for each benchmark. Once the optimal policy is learned offline,
the corresponding action bit table is fed to the RTL simulator
along with dynamic traces of processor power consumption
to estimate the program execution time with the learned
policy. The power traces are generated by feeding the value
change dump (VCD) files from each benchmark’s execution
to Cadence RTL Compiler. The power traces used for offline
training and online validation are different, obtained from the
same Markov chain model. Our results are presented on several
benchmarks (CHStone [33] and FFT [34]).
C. Comparison with Prior Art
The Q-learning based approach is compared with two
techniques from prior art. The conservative policy is based
on the work in [6], [13], where the checkpointing decisions
are made only on the current battery level. The conservative
policy checkpoints any time the energy level in the battery
falls below a threshold, that is equal to the energy required
to checkpoint the PC, RF contents and the data cache. The
processor is then turned off and restored only when the battery
level exceeds another threshold, which is at least the amount of
energy required to read and decrypt data from the nonvolatile
memory plus the energy to perform a checkpoint. The policy
is conservative in that it accumulates the energy required
to perform a full checkpoint in battery before starting the
Fig. 8: Comparison of normalized execution times: Q-Learning
based checkpointing policy vs periodic [12] and conservative
policies [6], [13]. For each testbench, runtime is normalized
with respect to the baseline execution time (without energy
failure) for that testbench.
program execution, guaranteeing that it never incurs any roll-
backs.
The second technique is a periodic checkpointing pol-
icy [12]. A running instruction counter is maintained, and
a checkpoint is performed any time the counter exceeds a
threshold. For fairness, we pick the best threshold value
averaged over all benchmarks (1000 instructions).
The learned Q-values as a function of battery level are
shown in Fig 7 for checkpoint (achpt) and proceed with no
checkpoint (aproc) actions. In Fig 7a and Fig 7b, the previous
checkpoint was taken one and six intervals before the current
interval, respectively.
The Q-values represent expected cost of the action, thus
the optimal policy chooses the action with lower Q-value. We
make two observations from this figure: (i) in both cases, as
the battery level reduces, the checkpointing action becomes
preferred to the no checkpointing action; (ii) however, the
threshold below which the checkpointing is preferred is lower
when the previous checkpoint was taken recently. In other
words, policies based on a static battery level threshold [6],
[13] are sub-optimal.
Benchmark
Periodic Q-learning
#CPs Total RB #CPs Total RBCost (s) Cost (s)
DFADD 12 0.302 7 0.290
MIPS 69 0.767 38 0.632
ADPCM 237 6.13 139 5.36
GSM 26 0.629 20 0.462
MOTION 58 0.674 42 0.769
AES 69 2.04 48 2.01
FFT 17 0.391 11 0.250
TABLE II: Comparison of Q-learning based checkpointing
with periodic checkpointing in terms of the number of check-
points (CP) and roll-back (RB) cost corresponding to re-
execution for various benchmarks.
The normalized execution time of the proposed Q-learning
based dynamic checkpointing policy to the periodic and con-
Fig. 9: Progress plot for the FFT benchmark using Q-learning
based checkpointing. Vertical lines represent checkpoint place-
ments. Checkpoints are triggered either by a low battery level
or when a long time has passed since the previous checkpoint.
servative policies are compared in Fig 8. Normalization is done
with respect to the baseline execution time with no energy
failure. For all the benchmarks, Q-learning results in the lowest
execution time followed by periodic and finally conservative.
Specifically, Q-learning is on average 1.3× faster than peri-
odic checkpointing. The improvements are even greater when
compared against the conservative policy.
From Fig 8 we can see that the conservative policy per-
forms poorly compared to the other methods. Although in
this method no overhead is incurred from roll-backs (and
consequently lost computation), significant amount of time
is lost waiting for the battery to recharge. On the other
hand, the periodic policy does not adaptively determine when
to checkpoint. Table II shows the number of checkpoints
placed by the periodic and Q-learning policies during runtime.
We can see that the Q-learning based policy places fewer
checkpoints compared to the periodic policy, thus incurring
smaller overhead due to checkpointing. The other observation
is that the re-execution cost due to roll-backs is smaller for
the Q-learning policy, proving that the checkpoints are placed
close to energy failure points, thus reducing the re-execution
cost.
The execution progress of the FFT benchmark is shown
in Fig 9. This figure plots the number of (useful) instruc-
tions executed, battery level and checkpoint locations for the
proposed Q-learning based checkpointing policy. Observe that
checkpoints can be triggered by low battery level (CP1, CP2,
CP3, CP5 and CP6), or when a long time has passed since the
previous checkpoint even if the battery level is high (CP4).
D. Sensitivity and Security Analysis
We explored the effects of varying the number of possible
battery levels (B) and super interval size (S). A simulator in
MATLAB was developed, implementing the program execution
with checkpointing and roll-back. The simulator estimates the
running time of the program by keeping track of the available
energy in the battery based on the incoming harvested energy
(synthetic traces) and consumed energy by the processor.
In the first experiment, we fixed the size of the super
interval, S = 100 and trained different models by varying B.
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Fig. 10: Sensitivity analysis of the Q-learning checkpointing
policy to (a) battery level B and (b) size of the super interval
S. The relative speedups compared to a model with B = 5 and
S = 50 are illustrated. With higher granularity of the battery
level and a larger super interval size, the Q-learning policy
performs better and program execution time decreases.
The running time of the program when the Q-learning policy
is used for checkpointing was estimated. Fig 10a shows the
relative speedup with respect to the performance of the model
with B = 5. We can see that training on higher granularity
for battery level results in better performance of the Q-learning
policy. Training a model with B = 160 resulted in more than
18% speedup of program execution time. However, the size of
state space grows linearly with the number of battery levels,
which is directly proportional to the size of memory required
to store the Q-values and also results in higher training times.
Note that the performance gain from increasing the battery
levels begins to converge after which higher granularity would
not gain much in terms of speedup.
In the second experiment, the effect of changing S was
examined. We trained various models by varying S and fixing
B = 20. Fig 10b shows the relative speedup of models based
on Q-learning policy with different values of S compared
to the model with S = 50. We can see that by increasing
the super interval size to 800, we get up to 7.2% speedup
in program execution time. Note that the size of state space
and hence the memory required to store Q-values grows
quadratically with the size of the super interval.
As was mentioned before, the non-volatile memory has to be
encrypted at all times to prevent an attacker from reading out
potentially sensitive data. However, once an attacker physically
captures an IoT device, they can read out an encrypted image
of main memory and checkpointed state. Then, by executing
their own code on the device and observing the corresponding
encrypted data, the attacker might be able to carry out a
chosen plain-text attack to recover the on-chip encryption key.
Although security analysis of PRINCE suggests that such an
attack is impractical (requiring at least 263 plaintexts [35]),
a cautious defender might still wish to to use stronger block
ciphers like AES. However, AES encryption further increases
the energy overhead of checkpointing. Our experiments for the
FFT benchmark showed 22% and 124% increase in runtime
when PRINCE and AES were used, respectively, for encrypt-
ing the checkpoints. In addition to chosen plaintext attacks,
the attacker might be able to launch a denial of service attack
if they can tamper with the energy source. While both the
original and secure schemes are susceptible to such attacks,
the energy overhead of secure checkpointing might increase
the vulnerability to denial of service.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed and evaluated a novel
Q-learning based online checkpointing policy for secure, in-
termittently powered IoT devices. Compared to the current
state-of-the-art, the proposed policy is the first to take into
account multiple factors, including forward progress, distance
to previous checkpoint and current battery level to judiciously
determine when to checkpoint. A detailed evaluation of the
scheme compared to the state-of-the-art demonstrates up to
1.4× reduction in execution time. We examine the effects of
varying model parameters such as battery level and interval
size on performance and the resulting trade-offs between
model complexity and performance and memory storage re-
quirements. Our future work involves incorporating other run-
time information in the framework, and experimenting with
an energy harvester and a lightweight processor.
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